The Sachar Committee Report and Its Ramifications

Posted on by

The Government of India constituted a High Level Committee chaired by Justice R. Sachar, to prepare a report on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India. According to the terms of reference,[1] the committee was to analyze:

  1. The geographic areas where the Muslims of India live, their patterns of economic activities, their assets and levels of income, employment, and socio-economic development as compared to the other communities of India.
  2. The proportion of Muslims in the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) list out of the total OBCs as provided in the different states of the country.
  3.  Access of the Muslim population to education and health services, infrastructure, bank credit and other government services as compared to the other communities of India.

The committee was then to identify the various sectors that required government intervention to address issues relating to the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community.

Reservations and the Muslim Community

The Constitution of India has assured the minority communities of the country equal rights to preserve and develop their religion, culture and language. All minority communities residing in India have the right to set up their own places of religious worship as well as their own educational and cultural organizations. The Government of India is also committed to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Despite that, and the fact that India has made tremendous economic progress, there are still areas where it has not always been possible to ensure the equal socio-economic development of all sections of society.

To address the problem, the Constitution of India provided two schedules of the lowest socio-economic sections of society for affirmative action – the Hindu castes and the tribal populations that were historically marginalized and would need affirmative action for their upliftment. Those castes and tribes that were listed in these schedules are called the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). It was also observed that there were other people or classes that had been historically marginalized, and these were called the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). However, the Constitution does not define the term ‘other backward class’ and leaves it to the State to determine what entails backwardness. The Constitution and the Government of India opted for reservation of seats in educational institutions and jobs for the marginalized sections of society as its affirmative action.

The Sachar Committee Report in its findings reveals that though there was a general consensus that some action needs to be taken to address issues of backwardness within the Muslim community there were significant differences of opinion within the community regarding the type of affirmative action the government should take in the form of reservations for Muslim OBCs.

  1. A majority believed that a separate quota for reservation for Muslim OBCs would help uplift them, while others feared that it would have negative communal repercussions. Zoya Hassan agrees with the latter view.[2]
  2. Some believed that good educational facilities and a non-discriminatory attitude would suffice.
  3. There were also differences as to who should be entitled to reservations:
    1. Dalit Muslims,
    2. The entire community,
    3. Or should it be based on some economic criteria.
  4. Another view was that the Muslims should have an SC quota similar to that available to Neo-Buddhists and Mazhabi Sikhs.
  5. There were still others who felt that the Muslim community should not receive a separate quota, but should be part of the general OBC and SC quotas, based on their ‘caste-like’ categories. This latter opinion has gained favour, as it is ‘constitutionally tenable’.[3] Several findings have in fact shown that there are Muslim communities, who follow the religion of Islam, but continue to practise the Hindu customs of the castes from which they were originally converted. The Dudekula Muslims of Andhra Pradesh[4] and the Vangujjars, the nomadic buffalo keepers of the north and north-western Himalayan regions[5] are two examples.

According to Zoya Hussan[6] the use of religion as a criteria for selecting backward classes is incompatible with secularism and ‘threatens the national identity and cohesiveness of the State’. To use religion as a criterion for reservation would require an act of parliament. This, according to Hassan could create communal tensions. Reservations under the SC category were set up primarily to provide social justice to the victims of the Hindu caste system. Since Muslims do not recognize caste, reservation cannot apply to them. Moreover, conversion to Islam and Christianity debarred Dalits from reservation.

She adds that further complications arise from differences within the community. The backward classes strongly object to the entire community being declared backward, as the upper Muslim classes have already benefited from representation in government jobs, to their own detriment and fear that the elite classes will swallow the entire benefits of reservation.[7]

Firoze Bakht Ahmed appears to share the apprehensions of the backward classes and has made a statement that the Muslim leaders have no voice or utility. They play vote-bank politics to gain political patronage, and it is their obscurantist attitudes that keep the community backward.[8]

Both groups, however, want to be included in the backward category, as otherwise they would have to compete in the unreserved category. Hassan is of the view that a minimum percentage within the general OBC group being reserved for Muslims would be appropriate.[9] Seik Rahim Mondal agrees with this assessment.[10]

Hassan argues that while affirmative action for disadvantaged groups is a historic necessity, there is a need to re-evaluate the concept of backwardness, to take into account the current realities of backwardness, by removing the caste concept, which was used to relieve institutionalized inequalities at an earlier stage. It is time to look at other criteria of social stratification, so that inequalities of class, gender and the disadvantaged of religious minorities are also appropriately addressed and social justice is provided.[11]

In two separate judgements (Jacob vs. State of Kerala and P. Rajendra vs. State of Madras) the Supreme Court noted that place of habitation and occupation also need to be taken into consideration for judging social backwardness, which is primarily the result of poverty.[12]

S. A. H. Moinuddin however, argues further stating that ethnic identity and social background of a community are important parameters to determine backwardness, otherwise there is a danger that the politically articulate could grab the maximum advantage.[13]

The Indian Muslim’s Identity

The Indian Muslim is identified by the burka for women and the cap and beard for men. This identity has often caused impediments for Muslims to access good housing, jobs and admission to mainstream educational institutions for their children. One outcome has been the rise of Muslim denominated schools, even though the majority would prefer their children to go to mainstream schools.[14]

The community as a whole appears to suffer from a feeling of insecurity, the extent of which varies in different geographic locations. The main cause appears to be government apathy during communal riots. This has resulted in many Muslim communities living in ghettos, that they consider ‘safe’. In particular, this affects women the most, and has been a further impediment to them accessing education, public transport and jobs, resulting in home-based work.[15]

Anwar Alam[16] states that while the democratization of other backward groups is ongoing, not only has this bypassed the Muslim community, there is no internal democratization, so that it lacks in social and educational reforms. He lays the blame for this on the Muslim leadership. They have introduced no social reforms for the community since Independence. They have exaggerated the threat perception of a minority community, furthering insecurity and ghettoization. For example, when the Muslims are as heterogeneous as any other community, why are they represented as a homogenous mass by the elite? Alam suggests this is so that the Muslim elite can demand reservations for the entire community, including themselves, since their children cannot compete in the general category.

Alam provides the example of Aligarh Muslim University that has a feudal, undemocratic academic culture, resisting any democratization of its functioning.[17]

Seik Rahim Mondal has brought up the point, that since the vast majority of the middle classes opted for Pakistan during the Partition, the Indian Muslim community lacked a strong middle class, which was a setback to the progress of the community.[18]

He appears to agree with Anwar Alam, when he states that the Muslim leadership never bothered with the Gopal Singh Report on the problems of Muslims, but was more interested in bringing up emotive issues. Similarly, they never bothered with Rajiv Gandhi’s 20 Point Programme for the upliftment of the Muslims.[19]

Irfan Ahmad adds that land reforms within the community are essential to empower the downtrodden of the community.[20]

Education and the Language Issue

The Sachar Report finds that though Muslims are aware of their educational backwardness, Madrasas and other private Muslim institutions often appear to be the only choice available to them.[21]

Firoz Bakht Ahmed[22] refutes this view. He maintains that the community has been misled by its fundamentalist leaders and has acquired a ghetto mentality; children are not sent to modern schools; girls are kept away altogether; and they have developed an obscurantist, unstable outlook. It is his opinion that the minority status has harmed rather than helped the Muslims, generating a ‘minority-majority’ mindset that has facilitated their ghettoization, by keeping them apart from the Hindus.

However, the Sachar Committee observed that are very few government primary schools in Muslim areas, and even fewer higher-level educational schools and institutions. Most of these are of a very low quality, with high teacher-pupil ratios. Muslims find it difficult to get jobs as teachers in schools, and those who do, it is alleged, are badly treated. However, the main cause for their educational backwardness is poverty. Children are required to earn for the family and even those who do go to school, cannot cope without tuitions or parental support, resulting in drop-outs after a few years of schooling. Further, in view of their conception of being discriminated against in getting jobs, Muslim families do not perceive any major gains from education.[23] Difficulties in getting jobs in government organizations, even with certificates and degrees, were brought up repeatedly, says the Report, while the situation in the private sector was worse.[24]

Madrasas are thus imperative for at least primary education. These are not merely institutions of religious teachings. There is an urgent need to modernize and upgrade them and get them affiliated to recognized education boards. These have resisted doing so, to date, in violation of Article 30 of the Constitution. It is to be noted, says the Report, that modernizing Madrasas does not exempt the government from its responsibility of providing mainstream educational facilities to the community.[25]

Urdu has been identified as the language of the Muslims in India as its knowledge is necessary for their religious education. There are few Urdu medium schools, and their state is abysmal.[26]

Anwar Alam contests this issue and states that Urdu has never been the language of the Muslim masses, who generally speak their regional languages. It is only the elite Muslims in the Hind heartland who promote the language.[27]

The Muslim Population in India: Distribution

The Muslim community in India is the second largest religious community after the Hindus, thus making it the largest minority community in the country. The 1961 census put the population of Muslims at 47 million out of a total of 439 million, thus comprising of 10.7 per cent of the population. This rose to 138 million in the 2001 census, out of a total of population of 1029 million, that is, 13.4 per cent. The Muslim population had thus increased by 2.7 per cent during the 40-year period, which works out to a rise of less than 1 per cent per decade. The Hindu population’s share fell from 83.5 per cent to 80.5 per cent, while the other minority communities remained more or less the same – Christians at 2.4 per cent, Sikhs at 1.8 per cent and Buddhists and Jains at less than 1 per cent.[28]

Since the findings of the 2001 census were made public there has been considerable speculation, and fears have been expressed that the Muslim population of India would overtake that of the Hindus. However, projections have shown that the share of the Muslims would rise to just around 18-19 per cent by the end of this century.[29]

Although Muslims are spread across the country, the states of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar and Maharashtra had over 10 million Muslims living in each of these states. Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Karnataka had five to 10 million each. Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Tamil Nadu had three to five million; Delhi, Haryana and Uttarakhand had one to two million; and Punjab and Orissa had less than one million. Except for the latter two states, it was found that the larger states had larger populations of Muslims.[30]

There were also large variations in the districts where Muslims lived. Districts with over one million Muslims include 10 in West Bengal, five in Uttar Pradesh, three in Jammu and Kashmir and seven in other states. In 51 other districts their population was between one and half a million. Thus about half the population lived in these 76 districts. There are 593 districts in India, of which nine were found to be predominantly Muslim constituting 75 per cent of the population and 11 districts constituted 50-75 per cent. Roughly 13 per cent of Muslims resided in these 20 districts. Thirty-eight other districts spread across the states had populations of 25-50 per cent, where 22 per cent of the total Muslims lived, and 182 districts had 10-12 per cent accounting for nearly half the population. There are 77 other districts where they constitute just 1 per cent or less.[31]

Further, 30.7 per cent of Muslims live in urban areas as compared to 27.8 per cent of the total population who live in urban areas.[32]

The Muslim population in India appeared to have a younger age profile, with 27 per cent Muslims in the 0-10 age group compared to 23 per cent overall, and 14.7 per cent in the 10-14 age group compared to 12.1 per cent overall.[33] While the sex ratio for Muslims is more or less the same as for the rest of the population the child sex ratio is higher at 986 compared to the overall figure of 927.[34] Similarly, the infant mortality rate is slightly lower than average, while life expectancy is higher.[35] Fertility rate has declined across the entire spectrum of the Indian population, including the Muslim community, where the fertility varies according to the socio-economic standards.[36]

Educational Status of the Muslim Population in India

The Constitution of India, under Article 45 of the Directive Principles of State Policy proclaims: ‘The State shall endeavour to provide within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.’

In 2002, education was made a fundamental right through the 86th Amendment to the Constitution. Article 21A now reads: ‘The State shall provide free and compulsory education for all children of the age six to fourteen years in such a way as the State may, by law, determine’, and Article 45 reads: ‘The State shall endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years.’ These commitments have largely remained on paper; neither the central nor state governments (education is on the Concurrent List) have found the will to implement them, and free and compulsory education for children has, for the most part, been ignored. Further, it has been found that many literates were unable to apply their knowledge of reading and writing to life applications and several reverted to illiteracy within 4-5 years of leaving school.[37]

The census of 2001 is the most commonly used estimate for literacy levels. It informs us that 65 per cent of Indians are literate. Males have a higher level of literacy than females and the levels in urban areas are higher than in rural ones, the gap in both cases being about 20 per cent. The Muslim literacy rate was 59.1 per cent, SC/ST rate was 52.2 and ‘all others’ was 70.8 per cent. In urban areas the gap between Muslim literacy levels and the national average and ‘all others’ was 11 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Though the overall levels in rural areas was lower, the gap between the categories was less. The Report emphasises that the SC/ST category have the lowest literacy levels across the country and that Muslim women with a level of 50 per cent are able to keep up with women of all other communities, and are far head of the SC/ST women.[38]

Compared to the 1960s the gap between Muslims and ‘all others’ decreased to some extent in urban areas, but remained the same in rural areas. The literacy rates for SCs/STs has increased at a faster rate in urban and rural areas and for men and women equally, than for all other Socio-Religious Communities (SRCs) during this period, and have continued to improve. Muslims on the other hand have not been able to improve their educational status on the same levels.[39]

The Report points out that it has been argued that greater opportunities for employment due to reservations, resulting in higher economic status have resulted in SCs/STs investing in children’s education (Desai and Kulkarni, 2005).[40] Since Muslims face impediments in gaining employment, this could be one reason why they have not met the challenges of improving their educational levels.

Mean Years of Schooling

The Census of 2001 has provided statistics for the Mean Years of Schooling (MYS) for children aged 7-16, or those children who should have completed matriculation. The average Indian child goes to school for only four years. In the case of Muslims, it is consistently lower at three years four months, for urban as well as rural areas throughout the country.[41]

The MYS for Muslims is lowest in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Uttarakhand and Delhi, while in Kerala, Bihar, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh their MYS is higher than that of the SCs/STs.[42]

Enrolment and Attendance

The Report has referred to the findings of the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in its Human Development Survey, 2004-5 and the National Sample Survey Organization’s (NSSO) 55th Round, 1999-2000 and 61st Round, 2004-5 for comparisons and information on enrolment and attendance, as these are not available from the census figures.[43]

The NSSO figures revealed the highest increase in enrolment for SC/STs at 95 per cent followed by Muslims at 65 per cent. In 1999-2000 the SC/STs had the lowest rates preceded by the Muslims, and by 2004-5, the Muslims had a rate slightly higher than most OBCs, but less than the national average.[44]

In states like Kerala, Karnataka, Delhi and Maharashtra, Muslim enrolments are higher than the average state rates, while in states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkand and Uttarakhand, the rates are lower than the state average.[45]

 The NCAER figures report lower rates of enrolment with a much steeper difference between the Muslims and the rest of the country.[46]

Differentials in Education at the School Level

The differentials in school education throughout the country are considerable in rural and urban areas, with the rural areas having the lowest levels. The Muslim attainment levels on the national level are only slightly higher than those of the SCs/STs, but considerable lower than the SCs/STs in the rural areas, primarily due to the abysmal levels of schooling of rural Muslim women. It is seen that at the national level, Muslim attainment in education worsens as the level of education rises from primary to middle school to secondary school.[47]

While 26 per cent of those over 17 years have completed matriculation nationally, only 17 per cent of the Muslims have done so. It was apparent that the increase in educational opportunities since Independence has not led to a narrowing of the gap between Muslims and the rest of the country; on the contrary the gaps have consistently increased, particularly among urban males and rural females, while the gaps for SCs/STs have reduced since the 1960s in the case of urban males and females, and rural males.[48]

Transition from Primary to Higher Levels of School Education

The Report quotes a study detailed by Desai and Kulkarni (2005) to discuss the issue of transition of children from the primary level to the middle, secondary and higher secondary levels of school education.[49]

According to the study, ‘Changing Educational Inequalities in India in the Context of Affirmative Action’, the probability of completing the different levels of school education has increased during the period 1983-2000 for all SRCs, including Muslims and SCs/STs, though they still lag behind. Of the children enrolled in primary school, about 44 per cent of Muslim children, 39 per cent of SCs, 32 per cent of STs, and 62 per cent of ‘all others’ are likely to complete that stage. This is the biggest hurdle that apparently needs to be breached as far as school education is concerned, for the figures improve at the high school levels. The percentage of Muslim, SC and ST children completing middle school is 65 per cent as compared to 75 per cent for ‘all others’. Roughly 50 per cent of Muslim, SC and ST children complete secondary school compared to 62 per cent of ‘all others’. About 34 per cent of ‘all others’, 26 per cent of Muslim and 23 per cent of SC and ST children make the transition from school to college.[50]

The government has set up Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas – residential ‘pace setting’ secondary schools – in the rural areas to provide high quality education to talented children. However, the percentage of Muslim children, particularly girls, who have appeared for the entrance test and been selected have both been far lower than their share of the population. This is despite the fact that the examination is held in 21 languages including Urdu, and the education is completely free up to Class 10 (matriculation).[51] (No reasons given in the report, but if Muslims send their children to Urdu medium schools, and these are abysmal as mentioned elsewhere, they would not have a chance in competing.)

While in the age group of 6-13 years, the share of students compared to the total population of all SRCs is more or less the same, this gap widens at the higher education levels for SCs/STs, Muslims and OBCs, with, in some cases the SCs/STs overtaking the Muslims. This is a clear indication that while enrolment initiatives seem to be working, action needs to be taken regarding retention of these students.[52]

Differentials in Higher Education

Only about 7 per cent of the Indian population over 20 years are graduates or diploma holders. Amongst the Muslims, the percentage is just 3.6, while those with technical education is a mere 0.4 per cent – somewhat similar to SC/ST figures. The latter figure is particularly important for Muslims as a substantial number are engaged in artisanal activities, for which technical training would help in their economic upliftment.[53]

The gap in the Graduate Attainment Rate (GAR) between Muslims and ‘all others’ has widened from the 1970s onwards, and while the Muslims initially had a higher GAR than the SCs/STs, the gap is closing, as the GAR for the SCs/STs has been rising, so that there is a very real possibility of the SCs/STs overtaking the Muslims, as is already apparent is some states.[54]

College Education

The proportion of Muslims in undergraduate courses in the universities in India is just 9 per cent, which is lower than their share of the population and also lower than the figures for ST and SC students. While Muslims are more likely to take up science and commerce streams, their presence in engineering and medical colleges is extremely low.[55]

In postgraduate courses, the Muslim presence comprises of 2 per cent compared to 24 per cent for OBCs and 13 per cent for SCs/STs, and are more inclined to take up professional courses.[56]

Premier Institutes of Learning (IIMs, IITs, Premier Colleges)

Entrance to the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) consists of an entrance examination followed by interviews. Figures for the number of Muslims appearing for the examination are not available, but one out of every three Muslim applicants is selected at the interview stage. However, they constitute only 1.3 per cent of the students on an all-India basis.[57]

Again, it is not known how many Muslims appear for the entrance examination for the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), but they constitute 1.7 per cent of undergraduate students, 4 per cent of postgraduate students, while the figure for PhD courses is marginally better.[58]

In the premier colleges of Indian universities, including arts, commerce and science, only one out of 25 students in the undergraduate courses is a Muslim and one out of 50 students in postgraduate courses is a Muslim, with a marginal presence in the science streams. Enrolment of Muslim girls in undergraduate courses is higher than Muslim males.[59]

The share of Muslims in MBA courses (other than the IIMs) was found to be 1 per cent, and in medical colleges, it was 4 per cent.[60]

Factors Contributing to Educational Achievements

The economic status of a family appears to contribute significantly to the education of children. Using the NSSO 61st Round data the Report analyses GARs for poor and non-poor households. It finds that less than 2 per cent of persons in the 20-30 age group from poor households are graduates, compared to 8 per cent from non-poor households, while the gap in GAR is much higher in non-poor households than in poor households, when the Muslims, SCs/STs and OBCs and other SRCs are compared.[61]

The percentage of graduates from poor households pursuing further education are: 16 per cent for Muslims, 23 per cent for OBCs, 28 per cent for SCs/STs and 29 per cent for the rest.[62]

While SC/ST graduates report the lowest unemployment rates, those of the Muslim community report the highest.[63]

Statistics reveal that once Muslim students overcome the secondary school level and attain eligibility for graduate studies, the proportion completing graduation are similar to all other SRCs. This shows that for Muslims, the main hurdle in achieving higher education is to be able to complete the secondary school level. It was also observed that the pool of persons eligible for higher education seems to be increasing for the SCs/STs.[64]

Madrasas and Maqtabs

Most children across all the SRCs study in government or government-aided schools, with about one-third attending private schools. Just about 4 per cent of Muslim children in the 7-19 age-group study in Madrasas. These figures totally dismiss claims that Muslims prefer to send their children to Madrasas, for religious education.[65]

It is important to distinguish between Madrasas and Maqtabs. Madrasas provide regular and/or religious education, except for the residential ones that provide solely religious education. Maqtabs are usually attached to a mosque and provide part-time religious education to children studying in mainstream schools, in order that they may learn Urdu and the scriptures. Government schools do not teach Urdu adequately, and knowledge of this language is essential to read the scriptures.[66]

While it is the government’s responsibility to provide education to the masses, often Muslims have no option but to send their children to aided Madrasas, particularly those who cannot afford schooling for their children, and where mainstream schools are not available. While there has been considerable discussion on the modernization of Madrasas, it is also crucial to provide affordable, good quality mainstream schools in the areas that lack these. It has been seen frequently, that where the state has failed and government schools are just not available, it has been the Madrasa that has stepped in to provide an education to Muslim children, making them at least literate.[67]

The Report recommends that an ‘equivalence’ needs to be established between the two systems, such that a child’s certificate from a Madrasa can have some bearing in the mainstream education system. Further, while modernizing the Madrasas, it is necessary to ensure that the basic infrastructure is available to introduce modern, regular subjects into the curriculum, using modern methods of teaching, with good, well-qualified teachers who receive adequate compensation. These items have been ignored to date when modernization was done, and the modern streams of the Madrasas have not been supervised or inspected. It should also be noted, the Report states, that even those who are in the Madrasas for religious training, should receive modern education, to make them aware of secular learning and bring them into the mainstream of modern day life.[68]

Firoze Bakht Ahmed seconds this and states that state sops such as the one in the 2008 Budget earmarking funds for the modernization of Madrasas failed to do anything to uplift the Muslims.[69]

Language of Instruction in Schools

There are sections of the Muslim population that claim that lack of educational institutions in the Urdu medium is one reason for the low level of education of the Muslims of India.[70]

The Constitution of India in Article 350A stipulates that it is the responsibility of the State to provide primary education in the mother tongue of children belonging to minority linguistic groups. However, despite committee recommendations in several states, the number of Urdu medium schools is very low compared to the Urdu speaking population.[71]

Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh have made better provisions for Urdu medium schools, particularly at the primary level. In Karnataka, for example, the number of teachers in Urdu are substantial and women teachers, even at the higher levels predominate. This is an important point, as Muslim families prefer to send their daughters to schools staffed by women.[72]

However, in general, and particularly in the north, there is a dearth of Urdu medium schools and schools that offer Urdu as an elective language, where the emphasis is on Sanskrit. The Report recommends that Urdu be offered as an elective language in areas where there are large Urdu speaking populations.[73]

The high drop-out rate amongst Muslim girls, according to the findings of the Report is not because Muslim families do not consider it important to educate their daughters, but primarily because of non-availability of schools within easy reach at lower educational levels, absence of hostels at higher levels, and lack of female teachers and availability of scholarships.[74]

Availability of Schools and Other Infrastructure in Muslim-Dominated Areas

In the rural areas, the percentage of villages with a high Muslim population that have schools is 85 per cent compared to 88 per cent where there is a lower population. In smaller villages the figures are 69 per cent and 82 per cent respectively. About one-third of villages with extensive Muslim populations have no educational institutions.

The situation is similar for other facilities such as health, post and telegraph offices, communication networks, all weather access roads, access to toilets, availability of water, sanitation and cooking fuel, electrification of the village, etc. (This type of lack in Muslim areas has been seen in other reports I have worked on.)

However, it is also to be noted that villages with large Muslim populations tend to be located in states and areas that are poorly developed in any case.[75]

Access to the Banking System

The Census 2001 figures show that areas with high Muslim populations have fewer households availing banking facilities, possibly due to the non-availability of banking facilities in these areas.[76]

The Report states that a study by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)[77] found that minorities did not receive the banking facilities that they were expected to, in the 44 minority concentration districts under study. They constitute 12 per cent of account holders in all scheduled commercial banks, which though it is close to their share of population, is far less than those of other minorities. Similarly, loans or amount outstanding with banks worked out to half of what this figure is for the other minorities. The RBI’s efforts to extend banking and credit facilities under the Prime Minister’s 15 Point Programme, benefited other minorities, but not the Muslims.[78] 

Exclusion of the Muslim community from access to credit and banking facilities is a matter of concern for their economic and educational upliftment.[79]

Standard of Living

In urban areas, the consumption levels of the majority of Muslims are roughly the same as for SCs/STs, at a monthly per capita expenditure of Rs. 400 to Rs. 500, while about half the urban Muslim population has an expenditure of Rs. 300 to Rs. 600. Poverty in the urban Muslim population is highest of all SRCs at a Head Count Ratio of 38.4 per cent, while it is better in the rural areas with an 11 per cent differential.[80]

Salaried Employment

Muslim participation in salaried jobs is poor – just about 13 per cent and these are mainly in casual labour. Even in urban areas, only 27 per cent of Muslims have regular work, while the figures are 40 per cent for SCs/STs and 36 per cent for OBCs. Further, only 24 per cent of Muslims are employed with the government, public sector and public/private sector, as compared to 39 per cent and 30 per cent for SCs/STs and OBCs respectively. In most departments of public sector undertakings and the Civil Service their participation does not exceed 5 per cent.[81] (Earlier the report mentioned discrimination against Muslims in employment as a reason for not investing in education.)

Muslims, it is found, are employed more in their own enterprises or the unorganized sectors, while 70 per cent of women work from their homes, compared to 51 per cent for other women workers.[82]

Government Employment

Muslims constitute only 3 per cent of the IAS, 1.3 per cent of the IFS and 4 per cent of the IPS. Even in the Indian Railways, their share is 4.5 per cent, mostly at lower levels of the hierarchy. Similarly in the Posts and Telegraph Services, it is about 5 per cent. Just about 4.9 per cent of the candidates appearing for the civil service examinations in 2003 and 2004 were Muslims – way below the share of their population.[83]

They constitute just 3.7 per cent of the teaching faculty and 5.4 per cent of the non-teaching staff in universities, while the figures for SCs/STs are 7.4 per cent and 16.9 per cent respectively. The picture is even more dismal in Public Sector Banks, where their representation is a mere 2.2 per cent.[84]

Muslim Society and the OBC List

The social structure of the Muslim community clearly displays social stratification that is inherited and occupation-based, with a hierarchical ordering, following endogamy, similar to the Hindu caste system, and the Census of 1901 listed 133 such social groups.

Present day Muslim society is divided into two main classes:

  1. Ashrafs who trace their ancestry to foreigners such as the Arabs, Turks, Persians and Afghans.
  2. The Ajlafs, who were converts.

The Ajlafs are further divided into three classes:

  1. Upper class Hindus who converted to Islam
  2. Middle class converts
  3. The Arzal or lowest classes converted from the erstwhile ‘untouchable’ castes with ‘unclean’ occupations.

Since the Constitution’s Schedule of Castes is restricted to Hindu groups with ‘unclean’ occupations, the ajlafs (equivalent to Hindu OBC) and arzals (equivalent to Hindu SCs) were called Muslim OBCs and were placed within the general OBC list.[85]

Affirmative Action Taken So Far

Two commissions were set up to ascertain the criteria to define a ‘backward class’, identify the social groups and propose remedial action. The first, the Kaka Kalekar Commission, submitted its report in 1955, and was rejected for using caste and not economic criteria to identify backwardness. The second, the Mandal Commission, submitted its report in 1980, and was accepted and partially implemented in 1991.[86]

While the Kaka Kalekar Commission listed 2399 backward castes, with 837 as most backward, the Mandal Commission listed 3743 castes. The Mandal Commission further identified ‘untouchables’ converted to other religions and communities known by their occupations, whose Hindu counterparts were in the SC list. Thus 82 groups of Muslim Arzals and Ajlafs were included in the OBC list. The Sachar Committee Report opines that the Arzals, being the worst off, should have been included in the SC list or at least in the most backward classes list.[87]

This commission identified particular communities as being backward on the basis of ‘time-tested criterion of backwardness evolved by different states’.[88]

It is widely believed that the Arzals are converts from the ‘untouchable’ castes and since they continue with their traditional ‘unclean’ occupations, they continue to be ostracised. Despite this, they have not been included in the SC list of the Constitution. This is a reflection of an old colonial order of 1936, barring non-Hindus in the list prepared by the British.[89]

The Report states that several people believe that this violates Articles 14-16 and 26 of the Constitution, guaranteeing equality of opportunity, freedom of conscience and protection against discrimination on grounds of religion, caste or creed.[90]

Several states have also had their own commissions, and these have their own separate lists of OBCs and MBCs, into which the Muslims have been added. Kerala has a 10-12 per cent reservation quota for jobs within the OBCs for Muslims. Kerala and Karnataka, further have the entire Muslim community in their states, barring the creamy layer in their OBC/MBC lists. About 95 per cent of the Muslims in Tamil Nadu are in the OBC list and almost the entire Muslim population of Bihar is in the MBC list.[91]

Zohra Hassan says that although the Muslims are included in the OBC list, they have not been able to get any actual benefit from this. She believes that a guaranteed percentage within the OBC quota for Muslims would help. She further states that so far, the better off from the backward classes have secured considerable benefits while those at the bottom, including the Muslims, continue to be marginalized.[92]

A few Muslim OBC organizations have been set up during the past decade, with the aim of including all backward communities into the OBC and SC lists. There is now a growing awareness that their problems are more social and economic than religious and an attempt is being made to forge bonds between Hindu, Christian, Buddhist and Muslim Dalits, which could well help a large number of Muslims to get out of their ghetto mindset. These organizations strongly resist attempts at placing the entire community on the backward list.[93] [94]

One peculiar result of state and central lists is that there are several groups present in the state lists that are missing in the central list and vice versa.[95]

Geographic Distribution of Muslim OBCs

The 55th Round of the NSSO gave the population of Muslim OBCs as 31.7 per cent, while the 61st Round gives it as 40.7 per cent of the total Muslim population and 15.7 per cent of the total OBC population. While in most states the majority of Muslims are now listed as OBCs, in West Bengal, the number is miniscule.[96]

Except for Lakshwadeep, where almost the entire ST population is Muslim, and Himachal Pradesh, where 7 per cent of the STs are Muslim, they do not have much of a representation in the ST list. However, all Muslim tribes do not have an ST status, despite the fact that ST status is given irrespective of religion.[97]

Educational Status of Muslim OBCs

Muslim OBCs lag behind all other OBCs, particularly in rural areas, where there is a significant lag, in literacy. Almost 55 per cent of Muslim OBC children in the 6-12 age group do not attend school, which is the same figure for general Muslims, but is much higher than for Hindu OBCs, which is 49 per cent.[98]

In general, the education levels of Muslim OBCs across the education spectrum up to the graduate level and higher is lower than the general Muslims, which in turn is lower than Hindu OBCs.[99]

Employment Status of Muslim OBCs

The NSSO 61st Round shows that 9.2 per cent of Muslim OBCs were unemployed during 2004-05, while the figures were 7.5 per cent and 7.7 per cent for Hindu OBCs and general Muslims. The figures are similar in urban and rural areas, and for men and women. Similarly, their share of employment in the formal sector was much lower at 3.5 per cent compared to Muslim general and Hindu OBCs (7 per cent and 11.3 per cent respectively). However, their daily wages are more than those paid to Hindu OBCs and general Muslims, showing that more Muslim OBCs tend to accept low salaried jobs. The figures are similar for all three SRCs working in the private sector, where more Muslim OBCs are employed. Women, on the other hand in all SRCs work predominantly from their homes, again with those from the Muslim OBC group being the largest number. In the public sector, for every 100 workers only one is a Muslim OBC, while three are from the general group and 11 are Hindu OBCs. The same is true of their presence in universities, where general and OBC Muslims have a notional representation, while the Hindu OBCs have one that is proportionate to their population.[100]

Economic Status of Muslim OBCs

The proportion of poor people within the Muslim OBC group is the highest at 38, followed by general Muslims at 35 and Hindu OBCs at 27, which is higher than the national average of 28. The situation in urban areas is even worse. The monthly per capita expenditure figures show similar results, with the Muslim OBCs having the lowest of the three groups.[101]

Recommendations of the Sachar Committee

The overall findings of the Committee was that Muslims across the board suffer greater deprivations than the Hindu OBCs but are marginally above the SCs/STs, in all development indicators. Those in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Assam are the worst affected.[102]

  1. Policies should be designed towards inclusive development and mainstreaming the community, while respecting diversity and removing its conception of discrimination.[103]
  2. Preparation of an accurate National Data Bank containing all relevant information on all SRCs, and the setting up of an Assessment and Monitoring Authority to evaluate the extent of development benefits accruing to all SRCs.[104]
  3. The setting up of an Equal Opportunities Commission to look into grievances of deprived groups, and the provision of a redressal mechanism for discrimination based on the UK Race Relations Act.[105]
  4. A nomination procedure to be created to enhance Muslim participation in governance at the grass roots levels and a more rational delimitation procedure to ensure that constituencies with a high percentage of minorities are not reserved for SCs.[106]
  5. Efforts to be made to reduce ghettoization and increase spaces for interaction between communities in education, living and employment by providing incentives to educational institutions, employers and builders constructing housing complexes to encourage greater diversity. Creation of more public spaces where communities can interact. Sensitization of public functionaries on the importance of diversity and dangers of social exclusion.[107]
  6. Promotion and enhancement of access to Muslims in the Priority Sector Advances to improve their participation and share in regular commercial banking for credit. More banks to be opened in Muslim dominated areas.[108]
  7. All the 58 districts with high Muslim population to be brought under the Prime Minister’s 15 Point Programme.[109]

Recommendations on Education

The Muslim community suffers acutely from educational deprivation. It has the lowest levels of enrolment in schools and participation in higher education, with the condition of girls and women being the worst. Causes for this vary from poverty to perceived discrimination in school environments. Free and compulsory education up to the age of 14 is the responsibility of the State and it is critical that the State fulfils this responsibility.[110]

  1. Textbooks should be evaluated and designed to teach appropriate values, including diversity, religious tolerance and to be purged of all inappropriate social values, particularly religious intolerance.[111]
  2. Creation of local community study centres to facilitate studies outside of homes, which are generally not conducive for studying.[112]
  3. The setting up of high quality government schools in all areas of Muslim concentration.[113]
  4. Mapping of the Urdu speaking population and provision of Urdu medium primary schools where there are concentrations of Urdu speaking people.[114]
  5. The majority of Muslim children drop out after middle school. These should be given technical training. Since most ITIs and polytechnics require matriculates, the Committee recommends:
    1. Entry qualifications should be reduced to Class 8.
    2. Skill development should focus on emerging market needs in high growth sectors where Muslims are concentrated.
    3. Entry eligibility should be extended to children educated in Madrasas, who are currently not eligible for several technical streams.[115]
  6. To improve the presence of Muslims in higher education, the best long-term measure is to ensure that they complete schooling.[116]
  7. The University Grants Commission should sensitize universities on the importance of diversity and provide additional allocation of funds linked to student diversity, for which a diversity index would have to be formulated.[117]
  8. Even institutions opened by the minorities should have diversity and the government could link additional funding based on a diversity index. Typically these are inaccessible to the poor from the community. Low fees and scholarships with funding from the government could make these available to the weaker sections.[118]
  9. Alternate, lower admission criteria for regular universities and autonomous colleges for the Most Backward Classes.[119]
  10. To ensure that girls continue their education the provision of hostels in towns and cities is an absolute necessity.[120]
    1. Hostels for boys is equally important for them to go to colleges, high rents and reluctance to rent houses to Muslims being an impediment.[121]
    2. Boarding houses in taluk headquarters to be built for children to live and study in local schools. This would remove them from the ‘ghetto’ atmosphere and the learning unfriendly atmosphere of their homes. Tutors could be appointed for remedial classes.[122]
  11. Muslim Wakfs should be encouraged to use their assets for the above two options.[123]
  12. Teacher training should include sensitization to diversity and the aspirations of Muslims and other deprived sections of society.[124]
    1. Until more Muslim teachers are available, they can participate as para-teachers.[125]
  13. More teachers are required for teaching in the Urdu medium.[126]
    1. It is imperative that the Urdu language is supported to provide a regular stream of Urdu teachers.[127]
    2. Urdu schools frequently have teachers who do not know the language, often because the posts are reserved for SCs/STs. This should be remedied.[128]
    3. The distortion in the Three Language Formula in schools should be corrected to allow for Urdu as an optional subject in the Hindi speaking belt and wherever there is a large Urdu speaking population.[129]
    4. High quality Urdu medium schools should be opened where required, with good quality textbooks.[130]
  14. Madrasas should not be looked on as an alternative to regular schools, but as a complement to them.[131]
    1. They should be linked with higher secondary mainstream schools that students can shift to.[132]
    2. Provision of an ‘equivalence’ mechanism to allow ease of transfer from Madrasas to mainstream educational institutions.[133]
    3. Recognition of degrees from Madrasas for eligibility to appear for government public sector competitive examinations, thereby making these sectors available for employment by Muslims.[134]
    4. The modernization scheme for Madrasas should be reviewed to remove the deficiencies.[135]

Recommendations on Employment and Infrastructure

  1. Policy interventions to help workers in growth-oriented sectors to become part of the larger network of market-oriented firms. Where workers are engaged in stagnant sectors, they should be given skill upgradation, education and access to credit to enable them to make the transition to growth-oriented sectors.[136]
  2. Interventions in occupations where Muslims are concentrated to update skills with modern management practices, new technologies and emerging marketing needs. Where the interventions involve youths with inadequate schooling, additional education would be required.[137]
  3. ITIs, and polytechnics could be located in areas with large Muslim populations to facilitate skill enhancements mentioned above.[138]
  4. A more transparent system of recruitment, with a member of the minority community on the selection board to enhance confidence (not to improve chances of Muslims being chosen).[139]
  5. Increase share of employment of Muslims in areas where there is considerable public dealing to improve their confidence in areas such as teaching, health care, police, banks.[140]
  6. All villages and other habitations should have proper infrastructure of good schools, health facilities, bank, water, electricity, sanitation, communication, roads, etc.[141]

Some of the Follow Up Action (With regard to Education and Employment) Proposed by the Government of India in Muslim Dominated Regions[142]

  1. Targeted intervention for improvement of basic amenities in 90 districts and 338 towns and cities with large minority populations
  2. An Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) was set up to monitor and implement a comprehensive programme for skill and entrepreneurship development among the Muslim community and ensuring easy access to credit to the clusters with a substantial presence of Muslims.
  3. Public Sector banks will open more branches in Muslim concentrated areas to provide loans and maintain a ‘Reasons for Rejection’ Register. Financial institutions to provide micro-finance.
  4. Outreach of upper primary schools to be expanded, with more ‘girls only’ schools.
  5. Priority in opening secondary and senior secondary schools.
  6. Special literacy drives to be undertaken.
  7. Block Institutes of Teacher Education to be established.
  8. Women’s hostels to be set up in schools and universities.
  9. Modernization of Madrasas to be revised and ‘equivalence’ to be addressed.
  10. A revised coaching and tuition scheme set up to improve employability and academic performance.
  11. Three scholarship schemes exclusively for Muslims proposed.
  12. Guidelines issued to government and public sectors to increase representation of Muslims.
  13.   Corpus of the Maulana Azad Education Foundation to be augmented.
  14. Wakf Act to be revised and properties developed.
  15. Sensitization to importance of diversity to be undertaken.
  16. Civil Rights Centres to be opened at universities.
  17. Committees set up:
    1. to review the Delimitation Act
    2. To set up an Equal Opportunity Commission
    3. To create a ‘diversity index’
    4. National Data Bank and autonomous Assessment and Monitoring Authority to be set up.

A Note on the Equal Opportunities Commission

The Committee to work out the details of an Equal Opportunities Commission, based on the UK Race Relations Act, has recommended that the benefits of the Commission should be made available to sections of society, cutting across all social groups, that feel discriminated against. It finds the necessity of defining ‘social identity’, taking into consideration not just economic backwardness, but social backwardness as well. The Committee stresses the importance of a public debate to determine what equality of opportunity means and to build a ‘deprivation index for the Commission to function effectively. It is of the opinion that the private sector should be included in the jurisdiction of the Commission.[143]

Reactions to the Findings of the Sachar Committee

A Public Interest Litigation Case by the Rashtriya Mukti Morcha vs. the Union of India and Others

  1. Citing literacy rates in other Muslim states the petitioners claim that the educational backwardness of the Muslims is a worldwide phenomenon, and Indian Muslims, have higher literacy rates than those in countries like Pakistan and Bangla Desh. (But these are very poor countries)
  2. The Report and ATR violates the Constitution by giving preferential treatment to only one of the five minority communities recognized by the Constitution. (Sikhs and neo-Buddhists are included in the SC list; not sure of the Jains and Christians, but Christians are included in the ST list, I think.)

 

[1] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. vi-vii.

[2] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[3] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 25-26.

[4] S. A. A. Saheb, ‘Dudekula Muslims of Andhra Pradesh’ in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[5] Shibani Roy, ‘Hindu Musalman: Vangujj Transhumance in Uttaranchal’ in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[6] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[7] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[8] Firoze Bakht Ahmed, ‘Keeping the Muslim Down’, Hindustan Times,Hindustan Times, May 20, 2008.

[9] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[10] Seik Rahim Mondal, Social Structure, OBCs and Muslims, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[11] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[12] S. A. H. Moinuddin, ‘Problems of Identification of Muslim OBCs in West Bengal’, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[13] S. A. H. Moinuddin, ‘ Problems of Identification of Muslim OBCs in West Bengal’, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[14] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 12-13.

[15] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 13-14, 22.

[16] Anwar Alam, ‘Democratisation of Indian Muslims’ in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[17] Anwar Alam, ‘Democratisation of Indian Muslims’ in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[18] Seik Rahim Mondal, Social Structure, OBCs and Muslims, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[19] Seik Rahim Mondal, Social Structure, OBCs and Muslims, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[20] Irfan Ahmad, ‘A Different Jihad’, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[21] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 15.

[22] Firoze Bakht Ahmed, ‘Keeping the Muslim Down’, Hindustan Times,Hindustan Times, May 20, 2008.

[23] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 16.

[24] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 20-21.

[25] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 17-19.

[26] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 18.

[27] Anwar Alam, ‘Democratisation of Indian Muslims’ in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[28] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 27-29.

[29] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 47.

[30] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 29-30.

[31] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 29-30.

[32] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 35.

[33] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 31.

[34] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 33-34

[35] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 36, 38.

[36] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 39.

[37] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 49-51

[38] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 52-53.

[39] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 54.

[40] Quoted by the Sachar Committee Report, p. 54, fn 8.

[41] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 56.

[42] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 56.

[43] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 56.

[44] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 56.

[45] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 56-57.

[46] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 57.

[47] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 59-60.

[48] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 60.

[49] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 62, fn. 13.

[50] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 62.

[51] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 63.

[52] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 72.

[53] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 64-66.

[54] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 66-68.

[55] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 71.

[56] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 71.

[57] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 68-69.

[58] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 69.

[59] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 69.

[60] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 70-71.

[61] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 73.

[62] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 74.

[63] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 74.

[64] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 75-76

[65] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 77-78.

[66] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 77-78.

[67] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 78.

[68] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 78-79.

[69] Firoze Bakht Ahmed, ‘Keeping the Muslim Down’, Hindustan Times,Hindustan Times, May 20, 2008.

[70] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 80.

[71] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 80.

[72] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 82-83.

[73] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 83.

[74] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 85.

[75] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 143, 146-9.

[76] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 136.

[77] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 123, fn. 1.

[78] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 126, 128.

[79] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 136.

[80] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 153, 155, 157.

[81] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 93-4.

[82] The Sachar Committee Report, pp 95-96.

[83] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 165-168.

[84] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 168-9.

[85] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 192-193

[86] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 194-195.

[87] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 195.

[88] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[89] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 201-202.

[90] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 202.

[91] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 198.

[92] Zoya Hassan, ‘Reservation for Muslims’.

[93] Anwar Alam, ‘Democratisation of Indian Muslims’ in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003

[94] Seik Rahim Mondal, Social Structure, OBCs and Muslims, in Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, 2003.

[95] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 200.

[96] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 204, 213.

[97] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 204-05.

[98] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 206.

[99] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 206-07.

[100] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 207-11.

[101] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 211-12.

[102] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 237.

[103] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 237-8.

[104] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 239.

[105] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 240-41.

[106] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 241.

[107] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 242-3.

[108] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 249.

[109] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 250.

[110] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 243.

[111] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 244.

[112] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 244.

[113] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 244.

[114] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 244.

[115] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 244-5.

[116] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 245.

[117] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 245.

[118] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 245.

[119] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 246.

[120] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 246.

[121] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 246.

[122] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 246.

[123] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 247.

[124] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 247.

[125] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 247.

[126] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 247.

[127] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 247.

[128] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 247.

[129] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[130] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[131] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[132] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[133] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[134] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[135] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 248.

[136] The Sachar Committee Report, pp. 251-2.

[137] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 252.

[138] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 252.

[139] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 252.

[140] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 253.

[141] The Sachar Committee Report, p. 254.

[142] Statement by the Minister of Minority Affairs in the Lok Sabha on August 31, 2007.

[143] Taken from Indian Express, April 5, 2008.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *